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Abstract 
The effect of  technological change on  wage differentials between  skilled and unskilled 
labour  has  been  extensively  investigated.  However,  the  existing  literature  provides 
controversial  results,  This  paper  provides  insights  into  the  relationship  between 
technological change and wage differentials by  constructing a DIGE model of  a closed 
economy. This model suggests a range of policy implications. 
The main results are: first, a technology upgrade increases wage differentials by  a larger 
percentage than the size of the shock in the short run and reduces wage differentials in the 
long run.  Second, government would expect an  increasing short-run and a decreasing 
long-run  wage  differential  if  it  increases  the  tax  rate.  Third,  the  effect  of  increased 
education investment on wage differentials is unambiguous in the short run. However, in 
the long run wage differentials decrease. 
JEL class~ficarinn:  C61; C68; Dl  0; D91; 53 1 1.  Introduction 
The effect of  technological  change on  wage differentials between  shlled and unskilled 
labour has been extensively  investigated.  A range of  empirical studies take a stand on 
skill-biased technological change being the reason for raising demand for skilled labour 
relative  to  the  demand  for  unslulled  labour,  therefore  leading to an  increase  in  wage 
differentials'.  Some  studies,  such  as  Heckman  et  al.  (1998)  and  Lloyd-Ellis  (1999) 
employ a general equilibrium model to capture the effect from both skilled labour supply 
and demand. The existing literature provides controversial results, as Lloyd-Ellis (1999) 
pointed out "Considerable microeconomic evidence finds a positive relationship between 
the introduction of new technologies into production and the returns to skill.. .ln contrast, 
recent  macroeconomic  experience  suggests  that  technological  change  and  wage 
inequality have been negatively correlated over time". 
This  paper  attempts  to  investigate  this  issue  by  using  a  new  method,  a  dynamic 
intertemporal general equilibrium (DIGE) model,  A relatively comprehensive theoretical 
framework of  a closed economy is constructed. It is a one-good, two-labour (skilled and 
unskilled),  and  three-agent  (firms,  households.  and  government)  model.  All  the  key 
variables. e.g. wages and domestic quantities of different types of  labour, are endogenous 
and are determined by the forces of supply and demand in their corresponding markets. 
By  using this model. both the short and long, run effects of the technological change on 
I  Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). Krugman and Lawrence (1994). Slaughter and Swagel (1997). Heckman 
et al. (1398) and Acemoglu (2000), take the stand. wage  differentials can  be  illuminated. Since government  1s  embedded in  this  model, 
policy implications can be  directly extracted from the simulation. The results from this 
theoretical model can also be compared with those from the empirical studies. 
There are four sections in this paper. It begins with a brief overview of the literature and 
r~~ethodology  in Section 1. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework of a DIGE model. 
Section 3 presents the simulation and Section 4 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The framework of  this model  is as follows: firms produce the good by  hiring physical 
capital  together  with  skilled  and  unskilled  labour,  they  then  sell  this  good  to  the 
households for consumption, to the government for education capital investment and to 
thenlselves for physical capital investment. The objective of each firm is to maximize its 
intertemporal profit.  The  ownership of  firms  belongs  to  households.  The  household 
supplies unskilled labour to firms and skilled labour to both firms and the government in 
order to earn wages which, together with the dividends from renting physical capital to 
firms.  finance  the  purchase  of  goods  and  education.  Leisure  is  consumed  by  the 
household with  an  opportunity cost of  not working. The objective of  households is to 
maximize utility by  an optimal distribution of consumption between the good and leisure. 
The govenment buys the good from the firms and transforms it into education capital. 
This  capital  is  combined  with  skilled  labour  hired  by  the  government  to  produce 
education. The role  of  government as  an  education  supplier is  essential, This model attempts to capture the reality of government supplying education in consideration of the 
associated externalities. The government balances its budget by collecting labour income 
tax2 and selling education  to the household. The accumulation of physical  capital, skill 
formation, education  capital  and  financial  assets drives  the  dynamic  evolution  of  the 
economy over time. 
2.1  Firms 
The production  function  of  the representative  firm is assumed to be  Cobb-Douglas  as 
follows" 
(1)  Q, = A - g  *  L;  P  L'*-P, 
where  Qt is  the  output,  A  is  the  technology  parameter  or  so-called  total  factor 
productivity, and K,  ~f,  L, are respectively the physical capital stock, the skilled and the 
unskilled labour hired by firms, a,  P, and (1-a-P) state the shares of the three employed 
inputs. 
Capital  accumulation  depends  on  the rate  of  fixed  capital  formation  J  and  the rate  of 
depreciation 6. 
ITnder the assumption of rising marginal  costs of  installation in the investment process, 
the total investment expenditure I is 
'  To avoid unnecessary complexities. a subsidy rate on investment and a tax rate on financ~nl  d~v~dends  1s 
assumed to be balanced out. 
' A CES product~on  function for both the good and educat~on  1s  also examined and it y~ellls  the similar 
conclusion of wage differentials with a technological shock ancl a taxatlon shook (3)  It  =  Jt *  [I + (Q,/2)(Jt/Kt)I, 
where 0 is a positive parameter, and (@/2)(J,/KJ  is the unit cost of  adjustment, which is 
assumed to be a linear function of the rate of capital formation. 
The current value Hamiltonian function is employed to solve the above autonomous one 
state variable system with  h as the shadow price of  capital. By  solving the first-order 
differential equation and applying the transversality condition, the shadow price of capital 
becomes 
(4)  h(t) = j,"  IQK + (~I~)(J/K>~I  e 
-(r+S)s  .  ds. 
where  QK  is the marginal product of capital and  (Q,/~)(J/K)'  is the marginal product of 
capital in reducing adjustment costs in investment at each point in time. Therefore, h is 
the increment to the real value of the firm from a unit increase in its investment at time t. 
2.2  Households 
The  aim  of  the  household  is to maximize  its intertemporal  utility  subject  to several 
constraints. 
Max.  loM  IJ(CL.  1,)  -  e'"'  . dt 
Subject to 
(5 
(6) 
dF/dt = r,Ft  + (I-  +c)  . (W,,t-L,at  + W  ,,,,  .L,t)-  C, -  PE,~  SE.~, 
dL,/dt = J,., - 6, .  L,.,. 
J,.,  S,.,  = J,,  .[I+-.---]. 
2 4, (8)  Ft  = At. Kt, 
where Ct is the consumption of the good,  I, is the leisure taking,  Q  is the rate of time 
preference, r is the interest rate, Ft  is financial assets. T is the tax rate, W,  and  W,  are, 
respectively the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour, P,,,  is the price of one unit of 
education,  S,,,  is the amount of education bought, J,, is fixed skill formation, 6,  is the 
depreciation rate of skill, L,, is the mount of skilled labour, and @ is the adjustment cost 
parameter. 
Equation  (5) is  the  household's  budget  constraint.  Equation  (6)  shows  that  net  skill 
accumulation is skill depreciation subtracted from fixed  skill formation. Equation  (7) 
states that education investment depends on fixed skill formation and an adjustment cost 
function. The adjustment cost relies on the ratio of  fixed skill formation to skilled labour. 
If  skilled labour is increasing, the adjustment cost is decreasing. This is plausible due to 
the spillover effect among labour. 
The current value Hamiltonian function is employed to solve the above autonomous two- 
state variables system with  p1  and  p2 as the respective shadow prices for the financial 
asset and skill. The shadow price of  skill is greater than the shadow price of the financial 
asset, because the total cost of  forming a unit of skill is greater than that of accumulating 
one unit of  financial asset. due to the adjustment cost of  skill formation. If  the shadow 
price of  skill is not greater than that of the financial asset, the household would like to 
defer  spending  on  skill  formation  and  instead  accumulate  financial  assets  for  future 
consumption. Applying the transversality condition to the shadow price of skill, p2, results in 
Equation (9) states that the shadow price of skill is equal to the present discounted value 
of future marginal utility. The first component of the shadow price of  skill contains the 
marginal utility of  consuming goods, the after-tax skilled wage, and the reduction of the 
adjustment  cost in education investment. It provides the gross  increment  of  utility the 
household can get from supplying one additional unit of skilled labour. The second part is 
the marginal disutility of offering one unit of skilled labour. Combining these two gives 
the  net  utility  the  household  can  achieve  by  supplying  one  unit  of  skilled  labor.  It 
substantiates the essence of ~2. 
2.3  Government 
Government is a supplier of education. The education production function is 
(10)  E = ~(K,.,,LY), 
where E is the education supply, KEl  is the education capital, and ~r"  is skilled labour 
working for government. The interpretation of KE,,  could be the hardware associated with 
schooling, e,g., classroom, equipment, etc. L,';  could  be  the  software  associated  with 
schooling, e.g.. teachers, administrators, etc. 
Education capital accumulates via governmental investment in education as follows 
(1  1)  dK~/dt  = I:,  -  SE  . KE,,, where  I:.,  is the government investment in education, and dE is the depreciation rate of 
education capital. 
2.4  Steady State 
A  full  model  in  a steady  state is presented  in  Appendix  1. This model  provides  the 
relationship between skilled and unskilled wage in a steady state as follows4, 
The expression of equation (12) is independent of  the functional form of both the utility 
and production functions5. It provides a rigorous theoretical result for wage differentials. 
The relationship  between  the  slulled and  unskilled  wage  depends on  the rate  of  time 
preference, the depreciation rate of skill, the skill adjustment cost parameter, the tax rate 
and the price of education. A higher skill adjustment cost, skill depreciation rate, or time 
preference, all tend to boost the wage differential. The reason why higher skill adjustment 
costs and higher skill depreciation  rates raise wage differentials is straightforward.  The 
reason for a larger time preference having this effect is that the rate of  time preference 
counts because  an  investment  in  skill  formation  takes  ttme  to  repay.  A  larger  time 
preference  involves  a  larger  adjustment  cost  for  skill  formation.  therefore  a  patient 
household will expect a higher skilled wage. 
'  Due to  the complicated framework. it is not poss~ble  to solve for a re~iuced  form of wage differentials 
'  A cle~~~ilecl  proof 1s available froin the author, By  equation (12), a technological improvement in the production pushes down the price 
of  goods. This motivates the government  to cut the  tax  rate  and  this  decreases  wage 
differentials. The government plays an important role in wage differentials in the context 
of the education price and taxation. The government controls education investment, and 
therefore,  impinges  on  education  price.  If  the  government  increases  education 
investment,  thereby  decreasing the  education  price,  it can  lead  to  a  decreased  wage 
differential.  A  cut  in  government  education  investment  leads  to  an  increased  wage 
differential.  What  matters  in  a  general  equilibrium  is  the  interactive  effect  of  the 
education  price  and  the  tax  rate.  Intuitively,  a  higher  tax  rate  makes  it  possible  for 
government to lower the education price. In a steady state, since skill formation catches 
up with the skill demand, a decreasing demand for education drives down the education 
price.  More  detailed  information  on  policy  implications  will  be  obtained  by  the 
simulation results reported in the next section. 
3  Simulation 
A shock to technology (A) in the form of an improvement by  1 per cent is examined. An 
increase  in  government  spending on  education  and  an  increase  in  tax  rates  are  also 
analysed to investigate their effect on wage differentials. Following convention, the ratio 
of the skilled to the unskilled wage is used as the measure of  wage differentials. Except 
for  the  interest  rate  and  the  tax  rate  in  absolute percentaze  change,  all  endogenous 
 variable:^ are expressed as the percentage change relative to the baseline. Production can 
be  skilled  labour  intensive,  unskilled  labour  intensive.  or capital intensive. Since this model is robust, and all three cases end with the same conclusion for the wage differential 
with  the  technology  shock,  only  one  case  is  presented.  The  following  simulation 
examines the case where production is skilled labour intensive. Appendix 2 presents the 
results of  the case where production is unskilled  labour intensive. The parameters and 
exogenous variables settings are as follows6: 
a = 0.3;  8 = 0.1;  5 = 0.6;  z = 0.3; 
fi = 0.4;  8, = 0.1;  SF.  = 0.1;  IF =10 
6 = 0.2;  @= 1;  T=8760;  @=I; 
y = 0.7:  A=  1. 
Figure  1 shows the transition of  wage differentials following the technology shock. A 
technology improvement enlarges the wage differential by  3.5 per cent in the short run, 
but  reduces  the  wage  differential  by  0,015  per  cent  in  the  long  run.  It  shows  that 
technological change has a relatively large impact, with  a larger size than that  of  the 
shock, on  increasing wage differentials in  the short run. This enlarging impact on wage 
differentials dies out in the long run. 
Figure 1 Wage Differentials by Technology Shock 
O4 ,---  --  I 
"his  is one settllig which avoids corner wlutions ant1 provides a reasoliable converplng time length 
I  I The reason for thls is that, in the short run, a technology improvement raises the demand 
for skilled labour. Since skill formation takes time, this shortage cannot be immediately 
filled. In the long run, with an affordable cost of skill formation, the skilled labour supply 
eventually catches up with the amount demanded. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect on wage differentials of an increased tax rate and increased 
government  spending on  education. In  the  short run,  an  increase  in  the  tax  rate by  1 
percentage point (i.e. from 30% to 3 1  %I)  raises the wage differential by  around 1.25 per 
cent due to the jump in the skilled wage and the fall in the unskilled wage. The reason for 
the  short-run  boost  to  the  skilled wage  is the  higher  government demand for skilled 
labour to produce education. The short-run fall in the unskilled wage is due to a drop in 
goods production caused by  a crowding out effect of higher taxation, resulting in lower 
demand for unskilled labour, In the long run, due to the glut of  skilled labour. the skilled 
wage falls below the baseline, and the unskilled wage increases above the baseline due to 
the relative  scarcity of  unskilled  labour,  so that the  wage differential  drops about 0.01 
percent  below  the baseline.  An  increase in  government  education  investment by  I  per 
cent pushes down the skilled wage and boosts the unskilled wage, resulting in reduced 
wage differentials. The effect in reducing wage differentials grows larger, to around 1.6 
per cent, in the long run due to the time needed to complete the skill formation. It shows 
that an increase in  government education investment will have a larger impact on wage 
differentials in the long run than in the short run. Figure 2 Wage Differentials from Taxation and Education Spending Shocks 
Taxation Shock  Government Education Investment  Shock 
0  10  20  30  40  0  10  20  30  40  50 
An  interactive effect on  wage  differentials from shocks to technology  and taxation as 
well as shocks to technology and government education investment can be analyzed by 
using the above results to provide interesting policy implications. 
A combined  shock of  an  improved technology  and  an  increased tax  rate results in  an 
increased short-run and a decreased long-run wage differential. An upgrading technology 
combined with  a reduction  of  tax  rate  shock results  in  a decreased  short-run  and  an 
increased long-run  wage differential. This result follows Figure 1 and 2, which  show a 
change of  the tax rate generating a larger effect on  wage differentials than  a shock of 
technology. Thus the effect from a cut in tax rate may offset the effect from a technology 
upgrade and dominate the net effect on wage differentials. 
Since increased education investment takes time to show its effect on wage differentials, 
a  combined  shock  of  a  technology  upgrade  and  Increased  government  education 
investment presents a short run effect dominated by  the technology  improvement, and a 
long  run  effect  dominated  by  the  education  investment.  That  is,  wage  differentials 
increase in  the  short run. In the  long run,  with  an  increase in  education  spending by government,  wage differentials decrease, and with a reduction in  education  investment. 
wage differentials increase. The simulation results of  these combined shocks are shown 
in Appendix 3. 
4  Conclusion 
This paper provides insights into the relationship between technological change and wage 
differentials  by  constructing  a  DICE  model  of  a  closed  economy.  Several  policy 
implications are also captured by this model. 
The main results  are:  first, a technology  upgrade  raises  wage differentials by  a larger 
percentage than the size of the shock in the short run and reduces wage differentials in the 
long run. The intuition for this is that skill formation takes time and is unable to fill the 
shortage of skilled labour due to a technology improvement in the short run. However, as 
long  as the  adjustment  cost  of  skill  is  affordable by  the  household.  the  skill  supply 
eventually  catches  up  with  the  demand  in  the  long run.  In  contrast  to  the  existing 
literature which emphasizes the role of  skill biased technological change in raising wage 
differentials. this paper  provides another argument such as the  adjustment cost of  skill 
playing a deterministic role in the long run effect. 
Second, government  would  expect  an  increasing short-run  and  a decreasing long-run 
wage differential if it increases the tax rate. A higher tax income enables the government to spend more on education, therefore. in the long run, the slulled wage drops due to a 
glut of skill labour and the unskilled wage rises due to a scarcity of unskilled labour. 
Third, an increase in government education investment provides education at  a cheaper 
price, therefore a larger amount of  skilled labour can be formed. The effect of increased 
education investment on wage differentials takes time to settle since education itself is a 
time consuming process. Hence, in the short run, the effect is not obvious. In  the long 
run, wage differentials decrease due to a glut of skilled labour and a scarcity of unskilled 
labour. 
Fourth,  the  interactive  effect  on  wage  differentials  of  a  combined  improvement  in 
technology and an increase in the tax rate follows the above result, i.e. an increased short- 
run but a decreased long-run wage differential. However, a reduction of the tax rate may 
generate an effect to offset the effect of a technology upgrade and ends with a decreasing 
short-run and an increasing  long-run wage differential. This depends on the size of  the 
tax rate shock. 
Fifth, the effect of education investment on  wage differentials takes time to carry out. A 
combined shock of a technology upgrade and increased government education investment 
presents  a short run  effect  dominated  by  the technology  improvement and  a long run 
effect dominated by the education investment. That is, wage differentials increase in the 
short  run, In  the  long  run.  with  increased  education  spending by  government.  wage differentials decrease, and with  a reduction  of  education investment, wage differentials 
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